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1 
 
I was asked to  suggest some  lessons from the experience of the NAFTA dispute 
Settlement mechanisms for the FTAA negotiations on dispute settlement. In this 
presentation, I will first review the experience of each mechanism embedded in NAFTA, 
and reach some conclusions of this experience. In the second section, I will derive some 
lessons for the FTAA. 
 
The NAFTA Experience 
 
When one reviews  the experience of the   results of the cases  that have been 
presented  within the various dispute settlement mechanisms of NAFTA   one can argue  
that the NAFTA partners have agreed to new rules and procedures that have  helped to 
enhance the management of their economic relations.  
  The overall record of litigation between the three countries over the past eight 
years under  the NAFTA  is one of commitment to the rule of law. The three countries 
have used the procedures roughly equally. The three have succeeded and failed in 
pressing their complaints. The three have generally accepted the results of panel 
proceedings and implemented the required changes in law and policy, although not 
always with enthusiasm and grace. On occasion, some additional pressure is required to 
resolve the issues. On other occasions, the resolution of one dimension of an issue has led 
                                                 
1 Prepared for presentation at the “ATELIER ALENA” organized by the  Institute D´Etudes Internationales  
of the University of  Québec at Montreal,   March 20th, , 2003.    
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to a flare-up of a related issue.2 In general, however, the three governments have been 
prepared to make full use of the system and to live by its results.  
 In general, panels has adjudicatory bodies have fulfilled their role very 
professionally and have decided as they were expected to do, namely, on the basis of 
fairness, efficiency, transparency, consistency, impartiality and reasoned decision making 
based upon the rule of law.  
  The NAFTA Chapter 19   binational panel process, for example, has  proved to 
be as popular a dispute settlement mechanism in NAFTA as it was in the Canada- U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) 3 To date (ie, through February, 2003), the NAFTA 
experience with Chapter 19 is more than  nine years, during which there have been 86 
cases initiated , including  cases completed, terminated or continuing;  and  during this  
period   NAFTA, panels have sustained decisions by administrative domestic authorities, 
and remanded others, seeking either clarification or stronger justification for the decision 
rendered, or in the absence of justification, determining that the decision be vacated. 
Experts reviewing the reasoning in such cases have generally agreed that the panels of 
experts, familiar with the economic and legal concepts, have performed their tasks ably 
and professionally and often more thoroughly than had been the case by the domestic 
courts.     
                                                
While some cases that took place between Canada and the U. S. during the period 
of existence of the CUSTA led some critics to charge that the bias of foreign participants 
in favour of their own litigants had tainted and discredited the Chapter 19 process, so far 
this claim has not been made regarding the NAFTA experience.4 And there are good 
reasons for this. So far there has been no case involving a decision split along national 
lines, more than eighty percent of the cases have been decided unanimously while the rest 
 
2 A clear example of this has been the saga of the sugar and HFCS cases where the developments in one 
have clearly affected the developments in the other. 
3 The CUSTA went into effect on January 1, 1989, and was succeeded by the NAFTA on January 1, 1994.  
During the five years of its existence, the Parties formally brought 47 cases against each other; this figure 
does not include disputes that were resolved in consultations prior to the establishment of a binational 
panel.  Of the 47 cases, 28 were directed against U.S. agencies (ie, either antidumping or countervailing 
duty determinations of the Department of Commerce, or injury determinations of the International Trade 
Commission), and 19 were directed against Canadian agencies (ie, against Revenue Canada–now Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency–for antidumping or countervailing duty decisions, or the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal for decisions on injury). 
4 It must be said that the charge of bias was considered unfair by most serious observers.  
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have involved majorities of mixed national origin. 
By any measure, the process has demonstrated a very high level of 
professionalism and lack of bias and despite that there has been a number of high-profile 
cases, has succeeded in resolving disputes on a more principled, less political basis. In 
short, Chapter 19 has proved a pleasant surprise in reducing the cross border temperatures 
in trade remedy disputes. It has forced officials in the three countries to operate within the 
scope of the law, and reduced the capacity of pro-protectionist industries to pressure 
administrative officials to favor their interests. 
The more general dispute settlement provision of NAFTA`s Chapter 20 on the 
other hand, have been used less frequently but as usefully. A variety of difficult issues 
have been resolved at the consultative level as well as at the Panel level.5 By the end of 
2002,  three cases had   been decided by a dispute panel, two brought by Mexico against 
the United States (Broomcorn Brooms and Cross Border Trucking) and one by the United 
States against Canada (Poultry and Dairy).  The panel decisions were considered of 
exceptionally good quality.  
 As for investment disputes,  the evidence overall from our analysis is that it is an 
efficient and thus effective mechanism to resolve investment disputes. By the beginning 
of 2003,  23 cases  had been initiated under NAFTA’s mechanism for the settlement of 
investment disputes.    Nine cases have been filed against Canada, nine against Mexico, 
and five against the United States of America. Eight of the twenty three cases have thus 
                                                 
5 Among  some of the most important cases that have been resolved through consultations are Uranium 
Exports  (Canada v. the U.S, 1994) in which bilateral consultations apparently resolved Canadian concerns 
over a suspension agreement between the U.S. and Russia concerning dumping of uranium, through U.S. 
assurances that Canadian interests would be taken into account. See Int´l Trade Rep. No. 12, (Apr. 5, 1995); 
Import Restrictions on Sugar (Canada v. United States, 1995) involving a dispute over American import 
restraints on Canada and a Canadian antidumping action against U.S. sugar, ultimately resolved when the 
U.S. and Canada negotiated revised sugar quotas; Restriction on Tomato Imports (Mexico v. the U.S. 1996) 
in which Mexican objections to a U.S. tariff rate quota  on Mexican tomatoes were ultimately resolved  
through an agreement between the U.S. government and Mexican growers suspending application of U.S. 
antidumping duties; Helms Burton Act (Mexico and Canada v. the U.S, 1996) in which Mexico and Canada 
challenged the U.S Helms-Burton Act provisions  restricting travel and facilitating lawsuits against foreign 
companies that invested in Cuba, ultimately suspending the complaint when the U.S. and the European 
Union  agreed to a face-saving suspension of a parallel WTO complaint; The threat by the U:S: not to 
comply with the NAFTA provision to allow Mexican avocados to enter the US market that surfaced in 
1996-1997 because it would introduce various pests into California, was ultimately resolved through 
consultations and Mexican avocados permitted to enter the US.     
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far reached a final award.6 Four of these six awards have been rendered in favor of the 
Claimant investor and four  of them in favor of the Respondent State.7 In the four cases 
decided in favor of the Respondent State, Mexico and the U.S. were the Respondent. 
Canada has been the Respondent State in two of the cases reaching a final award in favor 
of the Claimant and Mexico likewise in  two of them.  In one case decided against 
Canada, the S.D. Mayers Case,   the Arbitral Tribunal has not yet reached a determination 
on the amount of damages.    
The experience so far is that arbitrations are launched, Tribunals constituted, and 
proceedings undertaken, without the disputing parties dragging their feet or refusing to 
arbitrate. The disputing parties have had ample opportunities to submit their objections, 
challenges, submissions and claims.  The trend so far has been for Tribunals to allow four 
rounds of written pleadings on the substantive issues in addition to allow all jurisdictional 
and other type of challenges and submissions. Contrary to the other dispute settlement 
mechanisms under NAFTA, Chapter 11  investment arbitration utilize procedural rules, to 
the extent not modified by NAFTA, that exist and are applied also outside NAFTA, and 
that include independent administrative bodies (the case of ICSID and the ICSID 
Additional Facilities Rules), or that establish ways of solving impasses during the 
administration of the arbitration that do not rely uniquely on the willingness of the 
disputing parties. This contributes to the smooth and efficient conduct of the proceedings.  
Moreover, there has been no report of a NAFTA Party suggesting it would refuse or 
delay payment of damages if ordered under an award. In fact, there is the case of the 
government of Mexico which has already complied with the Metalclad award. This has 
several consequences. NAFTA investment arbitration is not designed to effect a direct 
change in the policy or measure in conflict. It facilitates enforceability and compliance 
                                                 
6  These are: Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States (The Azinian 
Case);  Waste Management Inc. v. The United Mexican States (The Waste Managament Case); Metalclad 
Corporation v. The United Mexican States (The Metalclad Case);  S.D. Myers v. the Government of 
Canada; (The S.D. Myers case);  and, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. the Government of Canada (The Pope and 
Talbot Case); Mondev International v. the U.S ( The Mondev Case) and ADF Group Inc. v. the U.S (The 
ADF Case).   
7 The Azinian and the Waste Management Cases were decided in Favor of the Mexican government while 
the Metalclad,  The CEMSA and the S.D. Myers and Pope and Talbot in favor of the Claimant investors 
and against the Mexican government in the case of Metalclad and CEMSA and  against the Canadian 
government in the two latter cases. The Mondev and ADF cases were decided in favor of the U.S. 
government. 
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because it is generally easier for a State to pay compensation than to change or amend a 
law or policy.  It is, or should be, an extraordinary remedy.  It is not the remedy to be 
sought for minor disturbances or measures that could be more effectively challenged 
through domestic remedies in order to secure the continuity of the investment.8  In fact, 
this mechanism derives from the customary law of claims under international law, and 
there, the exhaustion of local remedies constitutes a condition to raise a claim to the 
international level. Though under NAFTA, an investor need not as a general rule exhaust 
its local remedies as a procedural condition to bring a claim, the question of whether it is 
necessary to have exhausted local remedies to successfully claim a breach under certain 
of the substantive provisions has not yet been resolved by any Tribunal.9 
Despite of the above,  however, the Chapter has produced considerable controversy   
which  the NAFTA  governments  have been ready to address suggesting that  the 
governments seem to have  a clear sense of what the main purpose of the chapter should 
be. 
In sum, to the extent that Canada, Mexico and  the United States have been prepared 
to use available rules and procedures, it is clear that the new, more binding dispute 
settlement procedures have helped the management of Canada, Mexico and U.S. 
relations. The existence of international agreements does not mean that there will not be 
conflicts, only that there is better basis for resolving them. Since the three partners carry 
out one of the busiest trade relations in the world, it was to be expected that numerous 
disputes would arise as the NAFTA  agreements were implemented.   This expectation 
has not been wrong.  The application of clear rules within a set of binding procedures has 
ensured equality of standing among the three parties.  Agreed rules, not power politics 
has determined outcomes.   
 Nevertheless, there are limits to government’s willingness to cede control to 
international rules and procedures as illustrated by the continuing saga of or Mexican 
trucking services and sugar which have bedeviled Mexico-U.S. relations for the last 
                                                 
8   It is also extraordinary in that it is not a domestic type remedy, but an international law remedy. At 
issue is not whether the measure was lawful or legitimate under the domestic law of the Party, but whether 
it was contrary to the NAFTA investment obligations. 
9   For example, one of the question before the Loewen Tribunal is whether in order to successfully 
argue a breach of Article 1105 for denial of justice it is necessary that the claimant or its investment 
exhausted the available local remedies.   
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several years. Mexico’s restraint in adopting retaliatory measures on the trucking services 
case appear to be based on the judgment that while Mexico has the right on his side, the 
costs of adopting retaliatory measures both economically and politically outweigh the 
benefits. Mexico is also probably counting that the Bush administration in the end will 
implement the Panel recommendation as it has repeatedly announced it will and after the 
agreement between the Executive and Congress everything seems to indicate it will after 
all. 
The trucking services and sugar exceptions seem to have an echo in a number of 
high-profile WTO cases like the EU ban on hormone-treated beef  and U.S foreign sales 
corporations (FSC) which similarly remain to be resolved despite the benefits of panel 
proceedings. In these cases both the EU and the US  authorities have determined that they 
would rather face the wrath of their trading partners than that of the public or 
constituencies, and have not taken satisfactory action to implement the decision of the 
WTO panels.   
To conclude, much progress has been made over the past decade in enshrining 
into international agreements better rules and procedures to settle disputes, but 
international rules and procedures remain some distance from the level of certainty 
expected from domestic rules and procedures, particularly in politically controversial 
issues involving the policies of one of the major players, such as the EU or the US, or in 
bilateral cases involving stakes as high as those in softwood lumber or sugar. In the 
coming years, as efforts to expand and strengthen the rules keep pace with deepening 
integration, it will be important to pay equal attention to the concomitant need to ensure 
that the procedures for the settlement of disputes are sufficiently robust to make the rules 
enforceable and thus provide traders and investors with the confidence to make the best 
of the close ties among Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
 Lessons for the FTAA   
 
The extensive and varied mechanisms for dispute resolution that are embodied 
within the North American Free Trade Agreement  represent a unique approach (in their 
variety and breadth) to the well recognized need for sound dispute settlement 
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mechanisms in matters involving regional trade agreements. 10 What lessons can we learn 
from NAFTA for  the FTAA ? I think one can derive lessons from each of the NAFTA 
mechanisms and thus our discussion will focus in every one of them.   
 
 
Chapter 20 
   
 It  seems inevitable that the Chapter 20 mechanism or something similar will be 
embodied in one form or another in future regional free trade agreements. In effect,  the 
bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and Jordan concluded  in 
October 2000 incorporates a mechanism substantively very similar to Chapter 20 of 
NAFTA.11 Likewise, the issue of dispute settlement has arisen as well in the bilateral 
agreements of the U.S. with Singapore and Chile for which negotiations were initiated in 
the final days of the Clinton Administration and are being pursued by the Bush 
Administration. This Chapter also may be a model for the government-to government 
dispute settlement under the long-discussed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, if 
such an agreement is ever  concluded. In all of these agreements, as in NAFTA, there will 
be substantive rights and obligations not found in the WTO agreements that lend 
themselves to resolution under a bilateral or regional mechanism. 12 
As we  discussed before,  in a very basic sense, the Chapter 20 general arbitration 
mechanism has served the purpose for which it was intended reasonably well  
( if not promptly ) that is,  to resolve disputes that could not be resolved in the course of 
normal bilateral discussions. Certainly, when the NAFTA governments have had the 
                                                 
10 For example, The Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) incorporates a mechanism for third party 
resolution of disputes among the member governments, consisting of negotiations, a type of conciliations 
by the member governments, and compulsory arbitration. See Mercosur/CM/DEC No. 1/91 -Protocol of 
Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, reprinted in Thomas Andrew O’Keefe (1997)., Latin American  
11 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oct 24, 2000, 
art 17. 
12 Even though  most countries in the Western Hemisphere are all members of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) with its apparent superior structural and procedural framework, the fact is that  the WTO will  
not necessarily be an appropriate forum for all or even most disputes involving the FTAA  countries in a 
future FTAA agreement.  Like it happened in the case of NAFTA with  the cross-border trucking services 
provisions of Annex I,  it seems very unlikely that the FTAA parties, would be willing to entrust to groups 
of non nationals WTO panelists or the  members of the appellate body the task of interpreting legal 
provisions that are unique to NAFTA or the FTAA.   
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patience to persevere, the decisions rendered on the whole have provided a valid basis for 
resolution of the disputes that they addressed. However,  those who expect adjudicatory 
systems to follow set limits are likely to find the NAFTA chapter 20 system wanting. In 
NAFTA all the cases reaching the panel level have taken excessive delays in constituting 
the  panels, particularly  Cross Border Trucking Services and in one case, Sugar, it has 
been impossible to constitute the Panel has a result of the refusal of the United States to 
appoint panelists. These delays suggest the existence of significant procedural 
imperfections in the system particularly with regard to the apparent inability of the parties 
to agree promptly on panelists and the limited degree of secretarial support provided by 
the NAFTA governments. 13 
 In the FTAA or other agreements much of the delay in selecting chairpersons and 
or panelists, could be eliminated if the parties to the agreement utilized an appointing 
authority, such as the Secretary General of the ICSID or even the WTO secretariat, who 
would be empowered to select a chairperson if the disputing parties failed to agree on one 
within thirty days. 14 The appointing authority would have to be provided with detailed, 
agreed upon guidance from the parties as to the qualifications and criteria for selecting a 
chairperson in order to avoid unpleasant surprises or unqualified candidates. A pre-
arranged chairperson roster would further facilitate this process. 
In an agreement with many parties—such as the FTAA—there is a necessity and 
an opportunity for a truly independent, adequately financed, secretariat with an adequate 
legal/professional staff and the authority to appoint panelists if the parties to a dispute 
cannot themselves promptly agree. If each of the parties appoints a roster of ten or more 
persons, as most WTO members have done under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
and the Parties can be encouraged to choose such rosters by merit, it is likely to be easier 
for any two disputing Parties to agree more quickly on a group of arbitrators. However, 
finding candidates both who are technically qualified and perceived as truly independent 
is likely to remain difficult regardless, given the due diligence that the disputing 
                                                 
13 The main problem in NAFTA for appointing panelists promptly has to do with the fact that the three 
countries have not fulfilled their commitment to appoint the thirty person formal roster contemplated in the 
Agreement. Nor have the three countries fulfilled the agreement to select by lot   the chairpersons when 
they have been unable to select one by agreement which is the first step to begin selection of the panel.   
14 This is the rule that applies in Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunals.  
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governments must exercise in preparing to litigate  issues of major political and economic 
importance.  
It has been suggested that the ad hoc arbitration model be replaced by a trade 
court, particularly in the context of the FTAA. 15 Despite the advantages that a court 
could have, 16 political acceptance of a permanent trade court for even multilateral free 
trade agreements seems problematic at best, for the same reasons it was impossible in 
NAFTA. The court concept simply raises too many issues that could detract from other 
important objectives of such agreements such as concerns over national sovereignty. 
Under these circumstances, an arbitral mechanism more like the WTO´s Appellate Body, 
but with original rather than appellate jurisdiction, with seven (or perhaps nine or eleven) 
persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade 
and the subject matter of the covered agreements, appointed for four- year terms and 
sitting in panels of three, should be considered 17  In the FTAA or the bilateral free trade 
agreement context, this group would serve as the panelists, without a separate appellate 
body. Of course, there would presumably be relatively fewer cases in comparison with 
the WTO´s DSB.  
The use of a much smaller roster, reasonably well paid for the part-time work they 
would be called upon to do  in panels of three or five , would speed up the panel selection 
process and could provide a degree of consistency in decisions that is probably 
impossible to achieve using ad hoc panel selection, particularly if like the members of the 
Appellate Body, all members of the roster consulted regularly  with each other in pending 
decisions.  
  
Chapter 19 
It is most likely that countries negotiating future free trade agreements   especially 
in the Western Hemisphere are likely to face the same conundrums Canada and Mexico 
faced when they negotiated NAFTA.   As the liberalization of the FTAA or other bilateral 
                                                 
15 See Sidney Picker, NAFTA Chapter 20 –Reflections on Party to Party Dispute Resolution, 14 ARZ. 
J.INT¨L & COMP.  L. 465 (1997) 
16 It seems reasonable to assume that a court, if properly organized and staffed, would eliminate the panel 
selection delays and assure a high level of trade expertise, as well as provide a higher degree of consistency 
among decisions. 
17 DSU, Supra note 2,  Art. 17(1), 17(2),  17(3). 
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agreements proceeds many countries will be in a position similar to Canada and Mexico 
and will have to make sure that  the foreign access they will gain from trade liberalization 
is not derailed by trade distorting actions like antidumping occurring within their 
principal trading partners which for many in the Western Hemisphere is the United 
States.   
The high propensity of the US to the usage of Antidumping actions helped 
precipitate the creation of Chapter 19 administrative review  in the CUSTA and NAFTA 
and could do the same thing in the FTAA. Many argue that a first-best strategy would be 
to reform antidumping policy, 18 but that seems unlikely given the current political 
context as demonstrated in the passage of the trade promotion authority to the U.S 
Executive. 19 The next-best strategy may be to ensure that antidumping actions are at least 
taken in a fair and responsible manner by administrative agencies in importing countries. 
Were the FTAA countries to pursue the latter strategy, a likely course of actions would be 
to establish some sort of administrative review at the regional level.  
This process could follow the pattern we recommended above for the Chapter 20 
process, a regional roster would help to prevent the delays in constituting panels that of 
lately has experienced the NAFTA Chapter 19 process.  
 
Chapter 11 
It is likely that in future trade agreements like the FTAA where the U.S. is a party,  
there will be a proposal to include a chapter on investment with added provisions to 
provide for an investor state dispute resolution mechanism. In fact, a good number of  
countries in the Western Hemisphere have already signed Bilateral Investment 
Agreements (BITS) with the U:S, Canada and Mexico  which follow a similar 
institutional design as NAFTA chapter 11.. However, in considering  ways to handle 
investment issues in future regional agreements like the FTAA,  NAFTA experience with 
Chapter 11  can be useful in drawing conclusions about what to do at the regional level. 
                                                 
18 See Thomas M. Boddez and Michael J. Trebilcock, Unfinished Business: Reforming Trade Remedy 
Laws in North America (C.D.Howe Institute, Toronto 1993). 
19 One of the conditions that Congress imposed  to  the Executive Branch for the provision of new trade 
authority was not to compromise unfair trade laws in future negotiations. 
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First of all, the evidence from our analysis shows that NAFTA´s Chapter 11  is an 
efficient and thus effective mechanism to resolve investment disputes and to this extent it 
could serve as the model for any future investment agreement. Nevertheless, a number of 
issues have arisen in the operation of Chapter 11 that could usefully be addressed in a 
future regional agreement.   
 
 
 
 
Transparency   
 
There is no fundamental reason why investor-state dispute settlement should not 
be open to broader public scrutiny and accountability, particularly since issues of broad 
public concern may be litigated before an arbitral Tribunal.  Chapter 11’s origins lay in 
private arbitration procedures within which there were good reasons to observe 
confidentiality in order to encourage conciliation leading to the settlement of disputes. 
The capacity of an investment chapter at the regional level  to address issues of broad 
public concern, however, should trump these considerations. Steps should thus be taken 
to open up the process more than was done by the NAFTA Commission on the NAFTA´s   
Chapter 11 case.   Among the issues to be addressed is the extent to which documents 
should be made public and how, who should have standing to attend hearings, who 
should have standing to intervene before a tribunal, and similar issues. One way to 
address some of these issues is for the parties to negotiate procedures to be used in 
investment  cases, modeled on the ICSID and UNCITRAL procedures, but adapted to the 
unique requirements of  an FTAA investment chapter  
 
Scope of investor-state dispute settlement    
 
In great part, most of the controversy that NAFTA´s Chapter 11 has generated has 
to do with the fact is that  the scope of investor –state dispute settlement is not well set 
out in the Chapter, providing both litigants and Tribunals  with a lot of opportunity to 
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flesh it out, perhaps with more creativity than was originally envisaged. This is not in 
itself a bad thing, but may be contrary to what the parties intended. Similarly, some of the 
concepts in Chapter 11, e.g., in article 1105: ‘minimum standard of treatment’ remain 
vague and thus provide litigants and panelists with significant scope to make law.20 Case 
law will eventually fill this gap, but perhaps on a basis that goes beyond what the parties 
intended. One of the risks in any modern judicial process is the temptation for panels to 
legislate rather than adjudicate, particularly in areas where the substantive law is vague 
and subject to interpretation. Of course, most of the critics of Chapter 11 are among those 
who are most eager to make use of this tendency in other areas, e.g., international 
environmental and human rights agreements.   Nevertheless,  FTAA parties might be 
better served by using the experience of the past eight years in NAFTA as a basis for 
setting out a more considered view of the scope and intent of investor-state arbitration.  
 
Discipline on frivolous complaints   
 
  Some critics have expressed fears that well-endowed firms can use an investment 
chapter like NAFTA´s Chapter 11 procedures to chill legitimate regulatory measures. 
While, as noted above, there is little evidence to sustain this fear, a remedy can be 
envisaged. There already have been hints in some cases that costs can be awarded to the 
defending government in cases of malicious or frivolous cases. Tribunals in the future 
should be encouraged to make full use of this provision. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
20  Professor Sir Robert Jennings, former president of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, 
has delivered a strongly worded opinion to the Methanex panel, taking strong exception to the NAFTA 
Commission Decision delineating its interpretation of Article 1105. In his view, the Decision fundamentally 
twists rather than interprets the intent of Article 1105. If nothing else, his opinion underlines the need for 
some clearer statement of some of the basic concepts set out in Chapter 11. See Jennings’s statement at 
www.cyberus.ca/~tweiler/naftaclaims.html.  
